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POLICE MISTAKES OF LAW 
Wayne A. Logan∗ 
This Article addresses something that most Americans would consider a 
constitutional impossibility: police officers stopping or arresting individuals 
for lawful behavior and courts deeming such seizures reasonable for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, thereby precluding application of the exclusionary rule. 
Today, however, an increasing number of courts condone seizures based on 
what they consider “reasonable” police mistakes of law, typically concerning 
petty offenses, and permit evidence secured as a result to support prosecutions 
for unrelated, more serious offenses (usually relating to guns or drugs). The 
Article surveys the important rule-of-law, separation-of-powers, and 
legislative-accountability reasons supporting continued judicial adherence to 
the historic no-excuse position. In so doing, it illuminates the central role that 
police can play as interpreters—not merely enforcers—of the law, a role to 
date ignored by courts and commentators. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Police officers, like members of the public at large, can make mistakes, 
including relative to the scope and content of laws. Police mistakes of law, 
however, differ in kind and consequence. When police stop or arrest an 
individual based on a mistaken legal understanding, they not only violate their 
sworn duty to enforce the law but also effectuate an unlawful deprivation of 
physical liberty. Historically, as a result, police mistakes of law have been 
condemned by courts, triggering first tort liability,1 and later application of the 
exclusionary rule, based on a finding that the seizure was unreasonable for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.2 
Of late, however, courts have shown increasing willingness to excuse 
police mistakes of law, especially with respect to the myriad low-level offenses 
that play a staple role in modern policing. The Eighth Circuit, D.C. Circuit, and 




 See Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the 
Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 




 See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.5 (4th 
ed. 2004 & Supp. 2010) (surveying caselaw deeming seizures based on police mistakes of substantive law 
unreasonable and subject to the exclusionary rule). 
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what they deem objectively reasonable police mistakes of law.3 As a 
consequence, police are permitted to seize an individual for conduct that does 
not violate positive law and, with the exclusionary rule not at play, use the 
seizure to secure evidence in support of a prosecution for an unrelated offense 
of a more serious nature (typically involving guns or drugs). 
Lawless behavior by police is, of course, not unprecedented. During the 
first decades of the twentieth century, studies repeatedly highlighted the 
widespread incidence of illegal seizures,4 backed by the Orwellian assertion 
that police needed to engage in “illegality . . . to preserve legality.”5 The 
excesses, which over time inspired major public concern,6 figured centrally in 
the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution, with Mapp v. Ohio, the 
watershed 1961 decision extending the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule 
to the states, serving as a cornerstone.7 In later years, the seizure authority of 
police was further limited by, inter alia, decisions striking down substantively 
vague laws on due process grounds,8 casting into disfavor such time-honored 




 See infra Part I.B. 
 
4
 See, e.g., Caleb Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 16, 21–27 (1957) 
(discussing reports of illegal detentions occurring nationwide); Jerome Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic 
Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 154 (1953) [hereinafter Hall, Police and Law] (stating that 3.5 million illegal arrests 
and imprisonments occurred in 1933—a number that increased as of 1950); Jerome Hall, The Law of Arrest in 
Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 359–61 (1936) [hereinafter Hall, The Law 
of Arrest] (analyzing findings from Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles showing common incidence of illegal 
arrest); Sam Bass Warner, Investigating the Law of Arrest, 26 A.B.A. J. 151, 153 (1940) (discussing frequent 
police resort to illegal frisks). 
 
5
 ERNEST JEROME HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE: A STUDY OF THE UNLAWFUL ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
LAW 64 (1931). 
 
6
 See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14 
(1931) (“Indiscriminate exercise of the power of arrest is one of the most reprehensible features of American 
criminal justice.”); NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
MEETING IN ITS SIXTY-FIRST YEAR 274 (1952) (“At no time in history has public criticism of police services 
been as severe and as widespread as it is today.”). 
 
7
 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The rule was imposed on federal agents several decades earlier in Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
 
8
 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 51 (1999) (city antigang loitering ordinance); 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (California loitering statute); Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170–71 (1972) (city vagrancy ordinance). For a discussion of the troubling use of 
such laws to target African-Americans in particular for decades after the Civil War, see DOUGLAS A. 
BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL 
WAR TO WORLD WAR II 107, 112 (2008). 
 
9
 See generally HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 63–64, 70 (condemning the high prevalence of “on-suspicion” 
bookings in 1929 and 1930); Hall, The Law of Arrest, supra note 4, at 359 (identifying 3,500 “suspicious 
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Substantive law lawlessness has attracted less attention over time. But this 
too is ripe for change, given broader evolutionary developments. As law 
enforcement has become more proactive in recent years, relying less on citizen 
complaints10 and more on police investigative initiative,11 substantive law has 
assumed correspondingly greater significance. Modern-day strategies like 
order-maintenance policing and vigorous traffic patrol depend on the ever-
expanding array of low-level offenses contained in state, local, and federal 
codes as tools to stop and arrest individuals,12 providing bases to secure 
evidence or information allowing for more serious prosecutions. 
This street-level shift has, in turn, been facilitated by Supreme Court 
decisions increasing the discretionary authority of police to seize individuals 
without warrants. In 1996, in United States v. Whren, the Court held that the 
legal basis offered by police to justify a traffic stop can merely be a pretext to 
investigate suspicions of unrelated criminal activity.13 Five years later, in 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Court held that the menial nature of the 
offense justifying an arrest is constitutionally irrelevant, allowing police to 
allege violation of any law, however trivial in nature or consequence, as a 
 




 See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 
627–42 (1999) (discussing the reactive nature of early law enforcement); George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, 
Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 




 See Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1247–48 (2010) 
(discussing common police resort to minor offenses, especially concerning traffic, to secure evidence for more 
serious drug and weapons prosecutions). The practical importance of these many laws is magnified by the 
reality that police often enjoy authority to seize individuals for alleged violations of both their own 
jurisdiction’s laws and those of others. See, e.g., United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (noting that, absent “state or local law to the contrary,” state and local police enjoy power to arrest 
for violation of federal law). 
 
12
 See Christine N. Famega, Proactive Policing by Post and Community Officers, 55 CRIME & DELINQ. 
78 (2009) (examining various proactive policing methods now enjoying widespread use); Philip B. Heymann, 
The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 422–40 (2000) (same). 
 
13
 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); accord Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771–72 (2001) (per curiam) 
(validating a pretextual arrest on the same basis). The Whren Court also refused to impose any substantive 
limit on police seizure authority, stating: 
[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what point a code of law becomes 
so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary 
measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even if we could identify such exorbitant codes, 
we do not know by what standard . . . we would decide . . . which particular provisions are 
sufficiently important to merit enforcement. 
517 U.S. at 818–19. 
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constitutionally reasonable basis for arrest.14 Most recently, in Virginia v. 
Moore, the Court freed police from control of state procedural limits on their 
seizure authority, refusing to attach Fourth Amendment importance to their 
violation.15 
Today, as a result, state, local, and federal legal codes not only order 
society and serve as a basic job description for police.16 They also, in the 
absence of meaningful judicial limits on police discretionary authority, serve as 
a chief basis to ensure that officers act with the reasonableness demanded by 
the Fourth Amendment.17 
Despite this supremacy, legal scholars have failed to focus on the crucial 
role police play as interpreters (not merely enforcers) of substantive law.18 
While countless articles have considered the interpretive authority of judges,19 
prosecutors,20 and even juries,21 the latitude enjoyed by police—the lowest 
ranking, yet most visible, actors in the criminal justice system, who decide 




 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); accord Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2651 
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] basic principle of the 
Fourth Amendment[ is] that law enforcement officials can enforce with the same vigor all rules and 
regulations irrespective of the perceived importance of any of those rules.”). 
 
15
 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008). 
 
16
 See Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REV. 1599, 1612 (2009) (“Without the 
substantive criminal law, . . . policing would be unintelligible.”); Wayne R. LaFave, Penal Code Revision: 
Considering the Problems and Practices of the Police, 45 TEX. L. REV. 434, 436 (1967) (“[T]he substantive 
criminal law is not merely a list of ‘thou-shall-nots’ directed to the citizenry; it is also in large measure a 
definition of the job of the several police agencies in the state.”). 
 
17
 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
 
18
 See Coughlin, supra note 16, at 1612 n.35 (“It seems important, even crucial for us, to begin to 
consider how the police construe the substantive criminal law. What on earth do they make of the language of 
statutory prohibitions, and how exactly do they make it?”). 
 
19
 See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. 
L. REV. 189 (1985). 
 
20
 See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010 (2005). 
 
21
 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Jurors as Statutory Interpreters, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1281 (2003). 
 
22
 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 222 (1969) (“[T]he police are among the most 
important policy-makers of our entire society. And they make far more discretionary determinations in 
individual cases than any other class of administrators; I know of no close second.” (footnote omitted)); JAMES 




 One exception is found in Wayne LaFave’s seminal 1965 work on police arrest practices. See WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 85 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965) (“It 
is obviously important to determine how such criminal statutes should be interpreted by law enforcement 
personnel who must decide whether to arrest.”). 
LOGAN GALLEYSFINAL 11/1/2011 12:55 PM 
74 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:69 
This Article seeks to fill this void, doing so through the lens of the 
increasing willingness of courts to forgive police mistakes of law. Part I sets 
the stage for the ensuing discussion, providing a typology of police mistakes, 
which fall into two broad categories: constitutional and substantive law errors. 
Focusing mainly on the latter, the Article surveys the growing number of 
decisions that condone as constitutionally reasonable seizures premised on 
police mistakes of substantive law. While police have long been forgiven their 
trespasses—in a literal sense—in the context of searches, freeing them from 
the dictates of tort and property law,24 they are now being afforded freedom to 
deviate from criminal-code norms in the execution of their seizure authority. 
Part II discusses why the position promises to enjoy increasing support in 
the near future. First, much as courts have been more amenable to forgiving 
layperson mistakes of law because of the difficulties presented by the often-
technical nature of low-level offenses contained in codes,25 courts are showing 
concern for the enforcement difficulties these same laws present police. 
Second, forgiving police for their reasonable mistakes of law aligns with the 
now-dominant purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to deter “deliberate” 
and “culpable” police errors.26 Finally, judicial inclination to forgive police 
mistakes of law allows for what might be thought an appealing symmetry with 
qualified immunity doctrine, which shields police from personal liability for 
their reasonable mistakes of substantive law. 
The arguments, however, fail to persuade. Judicial forgiveness of police 
mistakes, on the rationale that the law is too voluminous and complex for them 
to master, rests on the unacceptable premise that those entrusted to enforce the 
law need not know and follow its actual prescriptions. Similarly, it is incorrect 
to assume that the exclusionary rule will lack influence. Rather than indulging 
“reasonable” police mistakes of law, the justice system should do its utmost to 
incentivize police knowledge of its actual requirements. Finally, the analogy to 




 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183–84 (1984) (refusing to invalidate police entry onto 
private property that violated state trespass law). 
 
25
 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 11 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955) (describing adherence to the 
traditional view that mistake of law is no excuse as “greatly overstated”); Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence 
of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 343 (1998) (noting that the no-
excuse principle “has been seriously eroded over the past century, and in recent years, this erosion has 
threatened to become a landslide” (footnote omitted)); Michael L. Travers, Comment, Mistake of Law in Mala 
Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1303–24 (1995) (discussing increasing eschewal of the no-excuse 
principle in response to concerns of lenity, moral culpability, and due process). 
 
26
 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009). 
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personal monetary liability, and its low expectation of police knowledge is 
consciously calibrated to avoid overdeterrence. Here, by contrast, lawless 
deprivations of physical liberty (and very often privacy) are in the balance, and 
the outcome is not a personalized remedy but rather a systemic sanction 
seeking institutional deterrence. 
Part III surveys the broader negative consequences of allowing police to 
stop and arrest based on their mistaken legal understandings. Most important, 
when courts condone such seizures they undermine basic rule-of-law 
expectations. Police officers, the public face and embodiment of “the law,” are 
permitted to invoke their monopoly on the lawful use of coercive force without 
legal basis, and any evidence they secure can be used to justify prosecutions 
for unrelated yet more serious offenses. Second, when courts defer to mistaken 
police interpretations of law, separation of powers is violated: police are 
allowed to serve as lawmakers, not law enforcers, based on what they 
reasonably believe the law to require or prohibit (not what it actually does). 
Finally, affording police latitude to err, free of the exclusionary rule, removes a 
key institutional incentive for legislatures to craft laws with less legal and 
linguistic uncertainty. 
Part IV considers how best to address the challenge of police mistakes of 
law. In keeping with the great faith the Supreme Court has placed in the 
efficacy of police training—so much so that it now sees less need for the 
exclusionary rule27—the Article urges increased emphasis on the quantity and 
quality of police substantive law training. Today, despite the integral role 
played by the substantive law in policing, departments dedicate surprisingly 
little time and attention to its instruction. Rather than indulging and 
encouraging police substantive law knowledge deficits, courts should refuse to 
condone police mistakes of law, and police departments should redouble their 
efforts to enhance and ensure police legal knowledge. What is needed, in short, 
is a substantive law counterpart to the Fourth Amendment procedural law 
mandate of Mapp v. Ohio, now fifty years old, incentivizing departments to 
teach, and rank-and-file police to learn, the scope and content of the laws that 




 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598–99 (2006) (finding a lessened need for the 
exclusionary rule given “the increasing professionalism of police forces” and “wide-ranging reforms in the 
education, training, and supervision of police officers” (quoting SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE 
CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950–1990, at 51 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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I. A TYPOLOGY OF POLICE MISTAKES OF LAW 
Notwithstanding its epigrammatic status in exclusionary rule debates, 
Justice (then Judge) Cardozo’s famous reference to “the constable [that] has 
blundered”28 has never been self-defining. As this Part discusses, the nature of 
the legal mistake at issue—constitutional or substantive—can have dispositive 
effect. 
A. Constitutional Law 
Police mistakes of constitutional law essentially assume two forms. The 
first concerns the constitutional validity of a statute invoked by police as the 
basis for a stop or arrest, as in Michigan v. DeFillippo.29 In DeFillippo, the 
Court upheld admission of evidence secured as a result of a search incident to 
an arrest based on violation of an ordinance later invalidated on void-for-
vagueness grounds.30 The Court observed that “there was no controlling 
precedent that [the] ordinance was or was not constitutional”31 and concluded 
that “[a] prudent officer . . . should not have been required to anticipate that a 
court would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional.”32 “Society,” the Court 
asserted, “would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to 
determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled to 
enforcement.”33 Exclusion is proper only when a law is “so grossly and 
flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be 
bound to see its flaws.”34 
Illinois v. Krull, which concerned police resort to a state law allowing 
officers to forgo a warrant before searching the premises of used auto part 
dealers,35 provides another example. In Krull, a 5–4 majority held that the 




 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). According to Judge Posner, reference to the 
“slightly archaic” term constable, summoning imagery of law enforcement from Gilbert and Sullivan, was 
intended to make police errors “seem trivial, almost comical.” RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN 
REPUTATION 56 (1990). 
 
29
 443 U.S. 31 (1979). 
 
30
 Id. at 40. 
 
31
 Id. at 37. 
 
32
 Id. at 37–38. 
 
33
 Id. at 38; accord id. (“Police are charged to enforce the laws until and unless they are declared 
unconstitutional. The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its 






 480 U.S. 340, 342–43 (1987). 
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generally”36—would not be advanced by penalizing officers acting in good-
faith, “objectively reasonable reliance” on an as-yet-constitutional law.37 Just 
as Leon earlier held that deterrence is not appreciably served by penalizing 
police for objectively reasonable reliance on a judicial determination that 
sufficient probable cause exists to issue a warrant,38 the Krull Court held that it 
is not served by reasonable police reliance on legislation.39 “Unless a statute is 
clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to question the 
judgment of the legislature that passed the law.”40 Echoing its prior holding in 
DeFillippo, the Krull Court held that exclusion was proper in only two 
circumstances: when “the legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility to 
enact constitutional laws” or when provisions of the statute in question “are 
such that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute was 
unconstitutional.”41 
The second principal area for police mistakes in the constitutional law 
realm concerns Fourth Amendment procedural doctrine. Here, the 
constitutional reasonableness of police behavior, and potential application of 
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, is measured by how the 
behavior sizes up against court-made standards. Stoner v. California,42 decided 
three years after Mapp v. Ohio, provides a helpful illustration. In Stoner, 
police, without first securing a warrant or gaining consent from the petitioner, 
searched his hotel room on the basis of consent obtained from the hotel’s night 
desk clerk.43 A unanimous Supreme Court,44 citing two prior cases invalidating 
hotel searches by federal law enforcement agents,45 held that the search was 




 Id. at 347 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)). 
 
37
 Id. at 349. 
 
38
 Id. at 349–50 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 920–21). 
 
39
 Id. at 350. 
 
40
 Id. at 349–50. 
 
41
 Id. at 355. 
 
42
 376 U.S. 483 (1964). 
 
43
 Id. at 485. 
 
44
 Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part, “entirely agree[ing] with the Court’s opinion,” 
but voted to remand the case to California courts to assess whether admission of the evidence seized in the 




 Id. at 489 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), and Lustig v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949)). 
 
46
 Id. at 490. 
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Since Stoner, judicially pronounced Fourth Amendment doctrinal 
expectations of police have proliferated, increasing the possibility of 
mistakes.47 Courts have been most forgiving when police rely on settled 
doctrine permitting the behavior in question that is later reversed. Much like 
laypersons, whose mistakes of law based on official pronouncements of law 
are forgiven,48 police are thought to act reasonably under such circumstances,49 
nullifying the need for the exclusionary rule.50 
B. Substantive Law 
Traditionally, courts have been far less forgiving of police mistakes of 
substantive law.51 As the Michigan Supreme Court observed in 1885: “An 
officer of justice is bound to know what the law is, and if the facts on which he 
proceeds, if true, would not justify action under the law, he is a wrong-doer.”52 
Police mistakes of law, even those based on what might be thought a 




 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1 
(1997) (referring to Fourth Amendment doctrine as “complex and contradictory”—“a vast jumble”); HAROLD 
J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 2 (1996) (bemoaning the complex web of 
exceptions contained in exclusionary rule doctrine); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 
83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985) (“The fourth amendment is . . . a mass of contradictions and 
obscurities . . . .”). 
 
48
 See Davies, supra note 25, at 357–58 & nn.70–71 (discussing doctrine of entrapment by estoppel and 
its acceptance in section 2.04(3)(b) of the Model Penal Code and many U.S. jurisdictions); John T. Parry, 
Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1997) (discussing theoretical 
underpinnings of the doctrine of entrapment by estoppel). 
 
49
 See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011) (“An officer who conducts a search in 
reliance on binding appellate precedent does no more than ‘ac[t] as a reasonable officer would and should act’ 
under the circumstances.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
50
 See id. at 2434 (holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable when “police conduct a search in 
objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent”); id. at 2429 (“About all that exclusion would 
deter . . . is conscientious police work. . . . [W]hen binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a 




 See LAFAVE, supra note 23, at 87 n.10 (“While the police officer must make no mistakes in statutory 
interpretation, his understanding of constitutional law need not be as great.”). 
 
52
 Malcomson v. Scott, 23 N.W. 166, 168 (Mich. 1885). 
 
53
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 121 cmt. i (1965) (“[N]o protection is given to a peace 
officer who, however reasonably, acts under a mistake of law other than a mistake as to the validity of a statute 
or ordinance.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 121 cmt. i (1934) (same). 
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More recently, police mistakes of law have been deemed unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.54 While police are forgiven for their reasonable 
mistakes of fact,55 they are not forgiven for their mistakes of substantive 
law56—even if reasonable.57 A seizure based on a “belief that a law has been 
broken,” as the Seventh Circuit has noted, “when no violation actually 
occurred, is not objectively reasonable,”58 triggering application of the 
exclusionary rule.59 
Today, however, this principled position is showing signs of weakening. In 
the Eighth Circuit, the vanguard of the shift, police can make “objectively 
reasonable” mistakes of law.60 Even though an individual’s conduct violates no 
law, a seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if a reviewing court 
finds that the officer operated under an objectively reasonable legal 
misunderstanding.61 Officers, the Eighth Circuit avers, need not interpret “laws 
with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense attorney.”62 
In assessing the objective reasonableness of police mistakes of law, courts 




 See, e.g., United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Stops premised on a mistake of 
law, even a reasonable, good-faith mistake, are generally held to be unconstitutional.”). 
 
55
 See, e.g., United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n officer’s 
mistaken assessment of facts need not render his actions unreasonable because what is reasonable will be 
completely dependent on the specific and usually unique circumstances presented by each case.”). 
 
56
 The distinction between mistakes of law and fact, while hugely important, is not always clear-cut. See, 
e.g., United States v. Miguel, 368 F.3d 1150, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2004); State v. Horton, 246 P.3d 673, 676 
(Idaho Ct. App. 2010). 
 
57
 See, e.g., United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[An officer’s] belief based 




 United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006); accord United States v. Tibbetts, 396 
F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[F]ailure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing 
it is not objectively reasonable.”); People v. Cole, 874 N.E.2d 81, 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“[A] police officer 
who mistakenly believes a violation occurred when the acts in question are not prohibited by law is not acting 
reasonably.”); State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 824 (Minn. 2004) (“[A]n officer’s mistaken interpretation 
of a statute may not form the particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity necessary to 
justify a traffic stop.”); State v. Lacasella, 60 P.3d 975, 981 (Mont. 2002) (“[O]bservations made by an officer 




 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying the exclusionary 
rule to bar evidence obtained by police as a result of a legally baseless seizure). 
 
60
 United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 
61
 See United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he validity of a stop depends on 
whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in the circumstances, and in mistake cases the 
question is simply whether the mistake, whether of law or of fact, was an objectively reasonable one.”). 
 
62
 United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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circumstances, including the fact that officers received training on the 
erroneous legal understanding63 or that the law was erroneously enforced by 
police in the past based on “common knowledge.”64 Police also act reasonably 
(and hence constitutionally) if they mistakenly enforce a law lacking a 
requisite “level of clarity”65 that has not yet been interpreted by the courts.66 
According to the Eighth Circuit, assessment of whether a legal mistake is 
objectively reasonable “is not to be made with the vision of hindsight, but 
instead by looking to what the officer reasonably knew at the time.”67 Even if a 
law “technically” does not forbid the behavior in question, a stop or arrest is 
nonetheless reasonable.68 Applying the foregoing, the Eighth Circuit in United 
States v. Martin, for instance, upheld a traffic stop based on a law requiring 
that vehicles be equipped with “a stop light” when the officer misunderstood 
the law to require two functioning lights, leading to discovery of marijuana and 
a federal felony conviction.69 
In addition to the Eighth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit70 and state appellate 




 See Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001 (attaching importance, inter alia, to “the training of police concerning the 
requirements of the [Motor Vehicle] Code”); United States v. Casey, No. 08-0116-01-CR-W-SOW, 2008 WL 
4288027, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2008) (holding that a mistake of law was reasonable based on training 
wrongly suggesting that a local defective equipment ordinance covered auto windshields), aff’d, 365 F. App’x 
725 (8th Cir. 2010); cf. Giron v. City of Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904, 949–50 (E.D. Ark. 2010) (deferring 




 Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001. 
 
65
 Id. at 1002. 
 
66
 See United States v. Henderson, No. 8:06CR283, 2007 WL 672920, at *2 (D. Neb. Feb. 28, 2007). 
 
67
 United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sanders, 196 F.3d at 915) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). A similar sentiment was expressed by a federal trial court in Ohio, which, after 
noting that the Sixth Circuit had not expressly addressed the issue, stated: 
A purely objective standard—under which the stop is invalid and the evidence suppressed if a 
judge later disagrees with the officer’s interpretation of the law—injects too much hindsight into 
the process. There is no good reason to require a traffic officer to have guessed correctly in 
advance whether a judge will later find the officer’s interpretation to have been correct . . . . It is 
enough to require the officer’s interpretation to have been objectively reasonable. 
United States v. Washabaugh, No. 3:07-po-253, 2008 WL 203012, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 22, 2008). 
 
68
 Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001. 
 
69
 Id. at 1000–02 (quoting OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE CRIMINAL OFFENSES CODE ch. 6, § 621(a)(3) (2010)). 
 
70
 See United States v. Southerland, 486 F.3d 1355, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[I]t [was] objectively 
reasonable for the officers to suspect that [the] dashboard plate was in violation of Maryland law, even 
assuming they were mistaken that the law required display of the front plate of the bumper.”). 
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they consider reasonable police mistakes of law. In Ohio, for instance, an 
officer’s mistake of law is a “minor transgression,”75 and in Georgia, a seizure 
is permitted when “the defendant’s actions [are] not a crime according to a 
technical legal definition or distinction determined to exist in the penal 
statute.”76 An officer need not “determine on the spot such matters as . . . the 
legal niceties in definition of a certain crime, for these are matters for the 
courts.”77 Applying its standard of objective reasonableness, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court has, for instance, upheld a stop for a speeding violation even 
though the relevant law was not applicable because no workers were present in 
the construction zone at the time (1:30 a.m.).78 
Courts have also forgiven mistakes when police invoke other jurisdictions’ 
laws as justifications for seizures; Travis v. State79 affords an example. In 
Travis, an Arkansas deputy county sheriff stopped defendant’s Texas-
registered truck because it failed to display an expiration date sticker on its 
license plate, based on the deputy’s incorrect belief that Texas (like Arkansas) 
required such stickers.80 The Arkansas Supreme Court condoned the stop and 
refused to exclude an illegal firearm discovered in an ensuing search, finding 
that the deputy “reasonably, albeit erroneously” interpreted the Texas law upon 




 See Andrews v. State, 658 S.E.2d 126, 128 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“If an officer, acting in good faith, 
has reason to believe that an unlawful act has been committed, his subsequent actions are not automatically 
rendered improper by a later finding that no criminal act has occurred.”).  
 
72
 See Moore v. State, 986 So. 2d 928, 935 (Miss. 2008) (holding that the totality of the circumstances 
created sufficient probable cause for a seizure, even though the belief occasioning the seizure was based on a 
mistake of law). 
 
73
 See City of Wilmington v. Conner, 761 N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he exclusionary 
rule may be avoided with respect to evidence obtained in an investigative stop based on conduct that a police 
officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believes is a violation of the law.”); State v. Greer, 683 N.E.2d 82, 83 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (same). 
 
74
 See State v. Wright, 791 N.W.2d 791, 799 (S.D. 2010) (“Any mistake of law that results in a search or 
seizure . . . must be objectively reasonable to avoid running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting Martin, 
411 F.3d at 1001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
75
 Greer, 683 N.E.2d at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 908 (1984)). 
 
76
 Jackson v. State, 677 S.E.2d 782, 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting State v. Rheinlander, 649 S.E.2d 
828, 830 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)). 
 
77
 McConnell v. State, 374 S.E.2d 111, 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). 
 
78
 Harrison v. State, 800 So. 2d 1134, 1139 (Miss. 2001). 
 
79
 959 S.W.2d 32 (Ark. 1998). 
 
80
 Id. at 33. Under Arkansas law, a vehicle registered out of state can be lawfully driven in Arkansas if 
the vehicle is in compliance with the other state’s applicable registration laws. See id. at 34 (citing ARK. CODE 
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Appeal has adopted a similar approach, forgiving police mistakes of other 
states’ vehicle registration laws, deeming such mistakes reasonable when the 
vehicle is from a state not geographically contiguous to California or when the 
foreign state’s motorists do not routinely drive on California roads.82 
Finally, signs of weakening judicial resolve are evident in other contexts. 
The caselaw provides numerous examples of courts expressing uncertainty 
over whether the traditional view should be followed.83 Likewise, courts 
regularly forgive admitted police mistakes of law when an alternative legal 
basis exists to support a seizure, even if not identified by police, on the 
reasoning that police need not “have a precise appreciation of the niceties of 
the law.”84 
II. FORCES DRIVING JUDICIAL FORGIVENESS OF POLICE MISTAKES OF LAW 
Viewed in historic terms, judicial willingness to forgive police mistakes of 
law can be viewed as aligning with a broader shift that dates back to Leon.85 
This Part examines the chief catalysts behind what is likely to be increasing 
momentum among courts to forgive police mistakes of substantive law and 




 See People v. Glick, 250 Cal. Rptr. 315, 319 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding stop based on an officer’s 
reasonable misunderstanding of New Jersey motor vehicle requirements). In a depublished opinion, the same 
court has also condoned reasonable mistakes of law by police more generally. See People v. Catuto, 265 Cal. 
Rptr. 895, 901 (Ct. App. 1990) (depublished) (upholding a stop when the officer was “not aware of certain 
obscure exceptions in the Vehicle Code”). 
 
83
 See, e.g., United States v. McHugh, 349 F. App’x 824, 828 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009) (“We assume, without 
deciding, that an officer’s reasonable mistake of law may not provide the objective grounds for reasonable 
suspicion to justify a traffic stop.”); United States v. Davis, 692 F. Supp. 2d 594, 600 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(following the traditional rule but noting that “[t]here is considerable appeal in the Eighth Circuit’s approach”); 
People v. Lopez, 242 Cal. Rptr. 668, 673 (Ct. App. 1987) (suggesting that there may be “exceptional 
circumstances” when a mistake of law might be reasonable); State v. McCarthy, 982 P.2d 954, 960 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1999) (noting, but avoiding determination of, the issue). For more subtle examples suggestive of 
equivocation, see United States v. Hughes, 606 F.3d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, No. 
03-30384, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3876, at *2–3 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2004) (per curiam); and United States v. 
Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 
84
 United States v. Marsical, 285 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002); accord United States v. Delfin-Colina, 
464 F.3d 392, 400–01 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that an officer can make a “significant mistake of law” so long 
as conduct potentially violates some law); United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“[The officer] was not taking the bar exam. The issue is not how well [he] understood California’s window 




 See Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 
488–89 (2009) (“Earlier, a familiar rule of strict liability applied to the police, just as it does to the rest of us: 
Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Leon held that, when an officer relied reasonably on a subsequently 
invalidated warrant, his reasonable mistake of law precluded exclusion.”). 
LOGAN GALLEYSFINAL 11/1/2011 12:55 PM 
2011] POLICE MISTAKES OF LAW 83 
A. Volume and Complexity of Laws 
A prime justification for forgiving police mistakes of law lies in the 
enormous number and often-technical nature of low-level offenses that 
commonly serve as bases to stop and arrest individuals. The expectation that 
the law is “definite and knowable”86 is no more tenable for police today than it 
is for the lay public.87 State, local, and federal codes overflow with 
provisions—often of a malum prohibitum or regulatory nature—prescribing 
what individuals must or must not do.88 For police, as noted at the outset, the 
profusion has coalesced with decisional law, which, in broadening the gamut 
of positive law justifying seizures, has had the ancillary effect of increasing the 
substantive knowledge demands imposed on police.89 
This discretionary freedom has not, however, been met with a 
corresponding expectation from courts that police can rise to the challenge. For 
instance, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Court’s landmark opinion 
affording police power to arrest for fine-only minor offenses, the Court 
worried about the ability of police to grasp “frequently complex penalty 
schemes,”90 especially because decisions must often be made “on the spur (and 
in the heat) of the moment.”91 Likewise, in Devenpeck v. Alford, the Court 
forgave an outright mistake of law by an officer (when an alternative legal 








 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 168 (5th ed. 2009) (noting historic common 
law expectation and recognizing its modern-day implausibility). 
 
88
 See Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 
1443–45 (2001) (surveying the proliferation of state, local, and federal criminal provisions). While especially 
evident in recent years, the proliferation itself is not unprecedented. See ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA 23 (Transaction Publishers 1998) (1930) (“[O]f one hundred thousand persons arrested in Chicago in 
1912, more than one half were held for violation of legal precepts which did not exist twenty-five years 
before . . . .”). 
 
89
 See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text. 
 
90
 532 U.S. 318, 348 (2001); accord Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 431 n.13 (1984) (“[O]fficers in 
the field frequently ‘have neither the time nor the competence to determine’ the severity of the offense for 
which they are considering arresting a person . . . .” (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 761 (1984) 
(White, J., dissenting))). 
 
91
 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347. 
 
92
 543 U.S. 146, 156 (2004). Remarkably, the officer was informed of the misunderstanding by Alford, 
the arrestee, who related that his audio taping of the encounter did not violate the Washington State Privacy 
Act, adding that he had a copy of the state appellate opinion confirming this in his glove compartment. See 
Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub. nom. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 
(2004). 
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limiting police arrest authority “can be complicated indeed,”93 the Court 
excused police from the need to know and follow them.94 
One sees the same tendency in the context of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion assessments.95 There, the Court has emphasized that 
officers are not “legal technicians”96 who utilize “[r]igid legal rules”97 or can 
be expected to provide anything like “library analysis by scholars.”98 Rather, 
such assessments are “nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen.”99 
When expressing these sentiments, the Court has cautioned that imposing too 
high an expectation risks creation of a “systematic disincentive to arrest,” 
which is to be avoided.100 
The volume-and-complexity argument, however, collapses under its own 
weight. In a perverse twist reminiscent of Kafka,101 lawless seizures are 
thought justified because the corpus of laws at the potential disposal of police 
has exceeded perceived bounds of reasonable comprehensibility and practical 
application. Such a view, even if not rejected on democratic-governance 
concerns alone, would appear especially unjustified given unprecedented 
improvements in the educational backgrounds of police102 and ready access to 




 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008). 
 
94
 See id. at 178 (“[The Fourth] Amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a 
constitutionally permissible arrest.”). Indeed, the officer arrested Moore with full knowledge that the arrest 
was illegal. See Joint Appendix at 15, Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (No. 06-1082) (indicating that 
the arresting officer proclaimed the right to arrest as his “prerogative”). 
 
95
 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 109–10 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[W]e trust 
officers to rely on their experience and expertise in order to make spur-of-the-moment determinations about 
amorphous legal standards such as ‘probable cause’ and ‘reasonable suspicion’ . . . .”). 
 
96




 Id. at 232. 
 
98
 Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 
 
99
 Id. at 235–36. 
 
100
 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 351 (2001). 
 
101
 See FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 3 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1956) (1925) 




 See Roy Roberg & Scott Bonn, Higher Education and Policing: Where Are We Now?, 27 POLICING: 
INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 469, 472–73 (2004) (surveying studies showing an increasing number 
of officers with college degrees). 
 
103
 See, e.g., Michelle Perin, Big Stuff in a Small Package, LAW ENFORCEMENT TECH., Apr. 2010, at 26 
(discussing the use of mobile computers by police on street patrol); Michael Rubin, Mobile Data in Action, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT TECH., Oct. 2009, at 82 (same). 
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B. Deterrence and the Exclusionary Rule 
A related argument favoring indulgence of police mistakes of law is the 
now-dominant view that the exclusionary rule applies only if the threat of 
evidence exclusion will deter the misconduct in question. While for decades 
the rule was justified both by the goal of deterring police misconduct and by a 
desire to avoid tainting the judicial process with illegally obtained evidence,104 
analysis today centers solely on whether the threat of evidence exclusion will 
deter culpable police misconduct.105 This orientation was especially evident in 
Herring v. United States, where the Court addressed whether an admitted 
police mistake (there, an arrest and search of an individual based on an invalid 
arrest-warrant record) should trigger the exclusionary rule.106 
A five-member majority, with Chief Justice Roberts writing for the Court, 
concluded that police mistakes resulting from negligence and not involving 
broader systemic errors do not trigger the exclusionary rule.107 While 
acknowledging that police negligence was susceptible of deterrence,108 the 
majority reasoned that any such deterrence did not appreciably outweigh the 
social costs of evidence exclusion (i.e., freeing the possibly guilty and 
impairing truth seeking).109 The threat of exclusion is warranted only in 
instances of “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some 




 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The exclusionary 
rule . . . accomplished the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official 
lawlessness and of assuring the people—all potential victims of unlawful government conduct—that the 
government would not profit from its lawless behavior . . . .”); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12–13 
(1968) (identifying maintenance of judicial integrity as a “vital function” of the exclusionary rule and stating 
that “[a]dmitting evidence in a criminal trial . . . has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which 
produced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur”). 
 
105
 See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 n.2 (2009) (“Justice Ginsburg’s dissent champions 
what she describes as ‘“a more majestic conception” of . . . the exclusionary rule,’ which would exclude 
evidence even where deterrence does not justify doing so. Majestic or not, our cases reject this 
conception . . . .” (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))). 
 
106
 Id. at 699. Leon itself, as noted by Justice Blackmun in his concurrence, “narrowed the scope of the 
exclusionary rule because of an empirical judgment that the rule has little appreciable effect in cases where 
officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on search warrants.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 927 
(1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 
107
 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704. 
 
108
 Id. at 702 n.4. 
 
109
 Id. at 701–02. 
 
110
 Id. at 702. 
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While Herring did not involve a mistake of law, its rationale aligns with 
judicial inclination to forgive police mistakes of law.111 Early expression of the 
view is found in the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. 
Williams,112 cited by the Leon majority.113 After emphasizing that “[f]ield 
officers are seldom trained as legal technicians,”114 the Williams court worried 
that sanctioning police for their “‘technical violations’ made in good faith”—
such as “reasonable interpretation of a statute that is later construed 
differently”115—might have deleterious effects.116 The court stated: 
[I]t may . . . mak[e] the officer on the line overcautious to act in a 
situation where proper and reasonable instinct tells him that the 
activity he observes is criminal. . . . It makes no sense to speak of 
deterring police officers who acted in the good-faith belief that their 
conduct was legal by suppressing evidence derived from such actions 
unless we somehow wish to deter them from acting at all.117 
Deterrence, however, most definitely figures here. A legal text, especially a 
facially unambiguous law or a judicial opinion interpreting an ambiguous one, 
unlike the case-by-case factual possibilities entailed in probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion assessments,118 has an ex ante epistemic baseline. In such 




 Herring’s applicability could be questioned on at least two bases. First, it arose (as did Leon, for that 
matter) in a context in which police possessed a warrant. Id. at 696. Courts, however, have often applied the 
good-faith exception to redeem warrantless seizures by police. See United States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 
1201, 1206 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (citing cases), aff’d, 408 F. App’x 90 (9th Cir. 2010); State v. Greer, 683 
N.E.2d 82, 85 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (invoking the good-faith exception to forgive an illegal stop based on 
what the court deemed an officer’s objectively reasonable mistake regarding a law prohibiting U-turns). A 
second basis might lie in the Herring majority’s recognition that its holding covered negligence that is 
“attenuated” from the challenged police search or seizure—there, presumably the negligence of a neighboring 
county police agency that failed to update its arrest-warrant database. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698. With police 
mistakes of law, misconduct is direct—that of an officer who, while perhaps acting upon an erroneous legal 
view generated by fellow officers or her department, alone is responsible for the mistake. For reasons 
identified by Professor LaFave, however, the attenuation consideration will likely be short-lived. See Wayne 
R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 
99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 770–83 (2009). 
 
112
 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 
113
 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 n.11 (1984). 
 
114
 Williams, 622 F.2d at 842. 
 
115
 Id. at 843. 
 
116
 Id. at 842. 
 
117
 Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 97–98 (5th Cir. 1979) (Clark, J., dissenting), rev’d 
en banc per curiam, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 
118
 See United States v. Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d 995, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Our precedent distinguishes 
between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law because mistakes of law can be deterred more readily than 
mistakes of fact.”). 
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exclusionary rule provides police with an incentive to learn and “properly 
understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.”119 While laws 
invoked by police can at times be indeterminate in scope or meaning,120 when 
police act on mistaken legal understandings in the face of such uncertainty, 
they are, in Herring’s terms “culpable,”121 much as laypersons are.122 By the 
same token, when departments fail to adequately train officers in the 
substantive law that they are charged with enforcing,123 Herring’s concern for 
“systemic negligence” is at play.124 Rather than assessing police mistakes in 
terms of “reasonableness”—a standard that always expands and never 
contracts coverage—courts should do their utmost to encourage restrictive 
interpretation and application of laws by police.125 They should not, as the 
Eleventh Circuit put it, “help the government’s case” and “use the alleged 
ambiguity of a statute against a defendant.”126 
The deterrence calculus shifts, however, as in the Fourth Amendment 
doctrinal context,127 when police act in reliance on settled judicial 




 United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); accord People v. Teresinski, 640 
P.2d 753, 758 (Cal. 1982) (in bank) (stating that excusing reasonable mistakes of law “would provide a strong 
incentive to police officers to remain ignorant of the language of the laws that they enforce and of the 
teachings of judicial opinions whose principal function frequently is to construe such laws and to chart the 
proper limits of police conduct”). 
 
120
 On indeterminacy more generally, in both its linguistic and legal forms, see TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, 
VAGUENESS IN LAW 9 (2000). 
 
121
 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009). 
 
122
 See Kenneth W. Simons, Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Criminal Law? Explaining and Defending the 
Distinction, 3 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 213, 218 (2009) (“[A]n actor who is aware that the law exists should make 
absolutely certain that he gets its content right.”). 
 
123
 This failure may be due to either mistaken or nonexistent substantive law instruction. On the latter in 
particular, see infra Part IV. 
 
124
 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. 
 
125
 See LAFAVE, supra note 23, at 86 (noting the traditional view that police should “employ a very strict 
construction [of statutes], particularly in doubtful cases”); Hall, Police and Law, supra note 4, at 171 (“In 
those cases [of uncertainty] the law that must be enforced is the narrow, strict interpretation of the relevant 
statutes and decisions.”). 
 
126
 United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003); accord People v. Reyes, 127 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 167, 173 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[A law’s coverage] is a legal question. If the law enforcement officer 
does not know the answer, he or she is not authorized to make the stop anyway.”). 
 
127
 See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 
128
 Of course, whether a construction is “settled” itself can be difficult to determine. As noted by one 
federal court in the context of Fourth Amendment doctrine more generally, extension of good-faith allowance 
carries risks: 
[I]t would encourage officers to test the limits of what case law would possibly permit. Today we 
may be looking at “well-established circuit law.” But is one panel decision well established? 
What if the opinion is entered two-to-one over a dissent: Is it still well established? Suppose the 
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instance, police are neither culpable nor susceptible of deterrence because they 
rely on authority from the judicial branch indicating that their legal 
understanding is sound.129 
Finally, full consideration of the deterrence calculus requires that due 
recognition be given to the tendency of police, engaged in the “competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime,”130 to take maximum advantage of any 
interpretive latitude provided.131 Officers, even if not Holmesian bad men,132 
know that their greater power to stop or arrest individuals carries with it greater 
authority to deploy an array of powerful investigative tools, such as frisks or 
full-blown searches, allowing them to secure evidence of unrelated yet more 
serious wrongdoing.133 Application of the exclusionary rule will temper this 
natural competitive ardor. 
 
circuit has a series of unpublished decisions on point? What about an issue the circuit has not yet 
addressed in any form, but that has received a unanimous decision from other circuits permitting 
the search? This brand of line drawing is the natural responsibility and task of the judicial branch, 
not of officers in the field. 
United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (W.D. Mich. 2009). When statutory scope and meaning, 
not broader doctrinal outcomes, are at issue, such uncertainty perhaps should be less common. Still, ultimately, 




 See United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing proper 
application of the exclusionary rule when an officer “personally misinterpret[s] the law” from instances when 
an officer acts on settled circuit caselaw, later reversed, allowing challenged search-and-seizure practice), 
aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 
130
 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 
131
 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he extent of any 
privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and apply themselves 
and will push to the limit.”). The tendency was recently manifest in police efforts to evade Miranda’s 
procedural strictures, which the Court has since condemned. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004) 
(plurality opinion) (“Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda cannot accomplish by 
training instructions what . . . Congress could not do by statute.”); see also id. at 610 n.2 (discussing training 
materials used to encourage police avoidance of Miranda requirements); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving 
Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 132–37 (1998) (same). 
 
132
 O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 
 
133
 See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION §§ 8.1–.6, 
10.4 (2008) (discussing the many investigative rights arising out of constitutionally valid seizures). Police can 
also use seizures to obtain information with longer term investigative utility, including DNA. See Al Baker, 
City Minorities More Likely to Be Frisked, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A1 (noting police reliance on stop-
and-frisk policies “to bank thousands of names in a database for detectives to mine in fighting future crimes”). 
Of late, the strategy has been expanded to locate potential relatives of the source from which the biological 
material was collected. See Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 291, 297–303 (2010). 
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C. Qualified Immunity Doctrine 
Momentum favoring judicial forgiveness of police mistakes could also 
stem from qualified immunity doctrine. Police have long been shielded from 
personal monetary liability in federal civil rights suits when they commit 
“reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their actions.”134 Just as the 
exclusionary rule turns on the objective reasonableness of officer mistakes, so 
too does the application of immunity,135 broadly encompassing “a mistake of 
law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and 
fact.”136 As Barbara Armacost has noted with regard to qualified immunity, 
“[I]gnorance of the law—at least reasonable ignorance—is excused.”137 
Forgiving what are seen as reasonable police mistakes of substantive law in 
criminal prosecutions could make for an appealing symmetry.138 
Qualified immunity, however, serves policy goals and functions that differ 
from the exclusionary rule. Because qualified immunity is at issue when police 
face personal liability, its generous standard is consciously calibrated to avoid 
overdeterrence. The standard protects “all but the plainly incompetent [officer] 
or those who knowingly violate the law,”139 seeking to shield police from 
“undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of 
liability.”140 Here, with motions to suppress, the physical liberty of 








 See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 n.8 (2004) (noting that “the same standard of objective 
reasonableness” applies in suppression hearings and qualified immunity determinations (quoting Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 
136
 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815 (quoting Groh, 540 U.S. at 567 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); accord Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (“Federal officials will not be 
liable for mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law.”); Solis v. Oules, 378 F. 
App’x 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2010) (forgiving an officer’s wrongful stop of a driver because his mistaken 
understanding of Washington traffic law was reasonable). 
 
137
 Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 584 (1998). 
 
138
 See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 800 So. 2d 1134, 1138–39 (Miss. 2001) (citing qualified immunity caselaw 
forgiving a police mistake of law in support of its decision forgiving a police mistake in the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule context). 
 
139
 Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. 
 
140
 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). 
 
141
 See People v. Arthur J., 238 Cal. Rptr. 523, 527 (Ct. App. 1987) (“One of our most cherished freedoms 
is the right to go about our lives without unjustified interference. We safeguard that right by requiring that the 
police know what the law is in order to arrest someone for a violation of it.”). 
 
142
 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (“A policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he must 
choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and 
being mulcted in damages if he does.”). 
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with their interests in remaining free of the trauma143 and the privacy intrusions 
that typically attend a police seizure.144 
Society should not shrink from demanding that police be deterred from 
wrongfully invoking the substantive law to seize individuals for putative 
offenses, creatio ex nihilo. Police can be protected from personal liability in 
civil court and yet have their actions subject to the exclusionary rule in 
criminal court.145 Recognition of this distinction is especially important if, as 
Professor Pam Karlan contends, the Supreme Court is now engaged in a “shell 
game,” exalting civil suits as an adequate substitute for motions to suppress 
evidence yet acting to make such suits more difficult to sustain.146 
III.  HOLDING THE LINE: WHY THE INCLINATION MUST BE RESISTED 
While plausible arguments exist to support judicial forgiveness of police 
mistakes of law, each, as just discussed, fails to persuade. As this Part 
establishes, inclination to forgive such mistakes should also be resisted for an 
array of broader, quite important institutional reasons. 
A. Rule of Law 
First and foremost, forgiving police mistakes of law—even those thought 
reasonable—should be rejected because it disserves basic rule-of-law values. 
As noted by Jerome Skolnick, “[P]olice in a democracy are not merely 
bureaucrats. They are also . . . legal officials, that is, people belonging to an 




 See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978) (“An arrest . . . is a serious matter for any person 
even when no prosecution follows or when an acquittal is obtained.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968) 
(acknowledging that police stops can be “annoying, frightening, and . . . humiliating”); William J. Stuntz, 
Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1064 (1995) (“The real 
harm . . . arises from the indignity of being publicly singled out as a criminal suspect and the fear that flows 
from being targeted by uniformed, armed police officers.”). 
 
144
 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (“[E]ven a limited search of the person is a 
substantial invasion of privacy.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–25)). 
 
145
 Cf. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 42 n.1 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting distinct 
litigation contexts of motions to suppress and private civil suits against police). On the distinct legal and policy 
concerns operative in the constitutional tort and criminal realms more generally, see Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights 




 Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-Horning, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitutional Rights in the Twenty-
First Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 882 (2010). 
 
147
 JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 233 
(Macmillan Coll. Publ’g Co. 3d ed. 1994) (1966). 
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seizures by police violate the basic tenet that ours is “a government of laws, 
and not of men,”148 lacking the basic legitimizing aegis of governmental 
authority.149 Reciprocal expectations of law-abidingness between government 
and citizens150 can scarcely be expected to endure if one party—the 
government—need not uphold its end of the bargain.151 
Betrayal of the norm is especially problematic in the context at issue here—
low-level offenses often of a malum prohibitum nature, the codification of 
which can be morally contestable,152 and where enforcement is already marked 
by a “kind of lawlessness.”153 When the wrongfulness of behavior is not self-




 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); accord Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 
405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (“The rule of law . . . is the great mucilage that holds society together.”); Olmstead 
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Decency, security and liberty alike 
demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the 




 As at common law, a government agent is clothed with governmental authority only when acting with 
lawful authority; otherwise, the agent acts as an unlawful trespasser. Davies, supra note 10, at 634. 
 
150
 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 40 (1964) (“These are the rules we expect [the citizen] to 
follow. If you follow them, you have our assurance that they are the rules that will be applied to your conduct.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 138–39 (1997) 
(“A consistent strain of our constitutional politics asserts that legitimacy flows from the ‘rule of law.’ By that 
is meant a system of objective and accessible commands, law which can be seen to flow from collective 
agreement rather than from the exercise of discretion or preference by those persons who happen to be in 
positions of authority.”). 
 
151
 See United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting “the fundamental 
unfairness of holding citizens to ‘the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse,’ . . . while allowing 
those ‘entrusted to enforce’ the law to be ignorant of it” (citation omitted)); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643, 659 (1961) (“Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own 
laws . . . .”); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959) (recognizing the “deep-rooted feeling that the 
police must obey the law while enforcing the law”); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the Rule of Law, 60 VAND. 
L. REV. 1497, 1506 (2007) (noting that the rule of law “requires that officials exercise governmental power 
pursuant to previously defined instructions that flow from collective agreement by the body politic . . . rather 
than pursuant to the idiosyncratic predilections or the whims of the officials”). 
 
152
 See generally Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005) (discussing diminished 
general compliance with laws that citizens perceive as normatively questionable or unjust); Paul H. Robinson 
et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 14–18 (2000) (stating 
that an effective criminal code must contain appropriate criminalization decisions, liability rules, and 
defenses); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and 
Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 22–28 (2007) (noting the ways in which laws may fall short of achieving 
moral credibility and, as a result, encourage noncompliance). 
 
153
 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 597 (2001). The 
concern is further aggravated in the traffic-law-enforcement context, where police authority to search incident 
to arrest for minor offenses has afforded power akin to the widely condemned general warrants of the colonial 
era. See Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to 
Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221 (1989). 
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with the broad array of laws contained in codes to avoid being ensnared by 
justice system insiders.154 Allowing police to use such laws to stop and arrest 
when the behavior in question does not actually come within their prohibitory 
scope, however, neutralizes even this basic planning possibility.155 When this 
occurs, the Fourth Amendment’s basic guarantee of the “people to be 
secure”
156
 is imperiled,157 along with the rights and expectations contingent 
upon its availability.158 
The concern here is thus unlike that at work in other contexts, such as when 
criminal law rules are inaccessible.159 Affording police authority to make 
reasonable mistakes of law allows an individual to suffer a Fourth 
Amendment-protected intrusion when the substantive law advanced in support 
of the intrusion does not proscribe the conduct in question. Borrowing from 
Meir Dan-Cohen’s classic construct, the lay public becomes subject to a 
“selective transmission” rule,160 with the conduct rule (expectations contained 
in code books) being trumped by a decision rule (ex post reasonableness 
determinations by reviewing courts). While, as Dan-Cohen notes, the 




 Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 




 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (“Stripped of all technicalities, [the rule 
of law] means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules 
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given 
circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”). On the role and function 
of laws as bases to enable human planning more generally, see SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011). 
 
156
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 
157
 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968) (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the 
“inestimable right of personal security” is “the right of every individual to the possession and control of his 
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of 
law” (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
On the importance of the security guarantee more generally, as opposed to privacy concerns, see Jed 
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 126–31 (2008). As Professor Rubenfeld notes, “To 
have personal security is to have a justified belief that if we do not break the law, our personal lives will 
remain our own.” Id. at 129. 
 
158
 See, e.g., Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, in POLICE POWER 
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 87, 97 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962) (“All the other freedoms, freedom of speech, of 




 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945) (plurality opinion) (condemning a law that 
merely referred the public “to a comprehensive law library in order to ascertain what acts were prohibited” and 
drawing a critical parallel to Caligula, who published laws in such a manner that no one could copy them). 
 
160
 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
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effect, functioning to limit official discretion and arbitrariness,161 and mitigate 
unwarranted harsh effects of the law,162 the opposite outcome obtains here. The 
public is not freed from the grip of state control but rather is subjected to it, 
based on a standard divorced from the substantive requirements of 
democratically enacted positive law.163 
Judicial approval of police mistakes of law can also have major practical 
importance. With law enforcement, as research has shown, public perceptions 
of procedural justice can influence citizen willingness to comply with the law 
and assist police.164 Branding lawless seizures as constitutionally reasonable, 
and as a consequence allowing incident searches and other intrusions, can only 
lessen confidence in the perceived fairness and legitimacy of police,165 already 




 Id. at 668. 
 
162
 Professor Dan-Cohen offers the ignorance-of-the-law defense as a prime example of the benefits of a 
“rift” between conduct and decision rules, serving to soften application of the traditional no-defense rule. See 
id. at 645–48. An optimal outcome is thus reached: the public learns of its “firm duty to know the law,” and 
decision makers know of their capacity to “excuse violations in ignorance of the law if fairness so require[s].” 
Id. at 648. 
 
163
 See id. at 665 n.110 (discussing a “clearly illegitimate” instance of selective transmission as one 
allowing for punishment for conduct not prohibited by law, using punishment of intoxication as an example). 
For a similar discussion, in the context of criminal procedure rules more generally, see Carol S. Steiker, 
Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
2466, 2540–51 (1996). 
 
164
 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION 
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order 
Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 
272–75 (2010) (finding that community perception of undue police behaviors negatively affects views of 
police legitimacy); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the 
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 253–65 (2008) (finding that citizens 
view police as more legitimate and cooperate with them if they treat people fairly). 
 
165
 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (“A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we 
recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an 
application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.”); see also ALBERT J. REISS, JR., 
THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 175 (1971) (“The legal exercise of police authority reinforces the right of police 
to use it, while its illegal exercise undermines the broader acceptance of the authority as legitimate.”). 
 
166
 See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1996) 
(discussing negative effects of police testimonial mistruths); Jennifer R. Wynn, Can Zero Tolerance Last? 
Voices from Inside the Precinct, in ZERO TOLERANCE: QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE NEW POLICE BRUTALITY IN 
NEW YORK CITY 107, 118–19 (Andrea McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds., 2001) (discussing instances of admitted 
police arrests of suspected drug dealers for minor offenses in the absence of probable cause to raise arrest 
statistics and disrupt drug sales). More within the bounds of legality, yet still contributing to overall public 
suspicion, is the acknowledged capacity of police to engage in trickery and deceit in their investigative work. 
See Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 155 (2009) (discussing the phenomenon of “authorized criminality”); Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, 
Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775 (1997). 
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circumstances, application of the exclusionary rule, rather than “generating 
disrespect for the law and administration of justice,”168 as its critics often 
contend, will have the positive effect of reinforcing faith in government law-
abidingness,169 a key aspect of what Tracey Meares has called “public-
regarding justice” and “fairness.”170 
Justice Holmes, when rationalizing the traditional refusal to excuse 
layperson mistakes of law, noted the “larger interests on the other side of the 
scales.”171 Today, as noted at the outset, this resolve is showing signs of 
attrition.172 Whatever the merit of modern-day arguments favoring allowance 




 See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK (2002) 
(surveying research documenting racial profiling by police and noting its negative effects); R. Richard Banks, 
Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 574–76 (2003) (surveying studies 
documenting disparate police targeting of minorities); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43 (2009) (same). 
 
168
 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976). 
 
169
 Cf. Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination of the Exclusionary 
Rule (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 
10-28, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1629375 (discussing experimental results showing 
significant support for application of the exclusionary rule, based on a judicial-integrity rationale, when a 
deterrence rationale would not compel invocation of the rule). 
 
170
 Tracey L. Meares, The Progressive Past, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 209, 216 (Jack M. Balkin 
& Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). The imperative of perceived justice and fairness “includes the interests of the 
whole public, not just defendants.” Id. This trust deficit, it should be noted, is exacerbated by the divergent 
views taken on police mistakes of law by state and federal courts. Iowa, see State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 
649, 652–53 (Iowa 2010), and Minnesota, see State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 822–24 (Minn. 2004) (en 
banc), for instance, unlike the Eighth Circuit—of which they are a federal jurisdictional part—categorically 
refuse to excuse police mistakes of law. As a result, evidence secured from a legally invalid seizure can be 
used to convict an Iowan or Minnesotan in federal court, yet it cannot be so used in state court. Of course, 
asymmetry also obtains with state court prosecutions in Georgia, which condones reasonable police mistakes 
of law, yet is encompassed within a federal circuit that does not. See supra note 71 and accompanying text 
(discussing caselaw in the state). 
 
171
 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap Press of 
Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (“Public policy sacrifices the individual to the general good. . . . It is no 
doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law, 
but to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make 
men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side 
of the scales.”). 
 
172
 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 
173
 Dan Kahan, for instance, has argued that a negligence standard is “unambiguously superior” to the 
strict liability approach that has traditionally barred the mistake-of-law defense for laypersons, reasoning that 
individuals will know that an excuse will be available to them if they take reasonable steps to learn the law, 
even if ultimately mistaken. Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 127, 133, 152 (1997). To Professor Kahan, moreover, strict adherence to the no-defense rule 
risks overdeterrence, having a “chilling effect on marginally legal behavior.” Id. at 142. 
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when the law actually authorizes it,174 fealty to the rule of law compels that 
police mistakes of law resulting in affirmative deprivations of liberty should 
not be tolerated. 
B. Separation of Powers 
Judicial validation of police mistakes of law also undermines separation of 
powers. Since at least the mid-twentieth century, criminal law norms, 
especially regarding less serious and malum prohibitum behaviors, have been 
codified by American legislatures,175 with courts providing secondary yet 
authoritative interpretive input.176 Allowing police, executive branch actors, to 
not only enforce but also interpret and expand upon such laws, based on use of 
an amorphous standard-like rule177 that is difficult for courts themselves to 
apply,178 represents a significant departure from this institutional 
arrangement.179 
When courts forgive mistaken police constructions of laws, a problem akin 
to that attending judicial approval of vague laws arises; a “potent message” is 
broadcast to law enforcement that “the limits of official coercion are not fixed; 
the suggestion box is always open.”180 Allowing police to make reasonable 
mistakes of law, as the Eleventh Circuit has observed, serves to “sweep 
behavior into [a] statute which the authors of the statute may have had in mind 




 See Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611, 626 (2011) (“Mistake of 
law doctrines deal with actors who violate the letter of the law but nonetheless assert as a reason for mitigating 




 See Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
335, 337–53 (2005) (tracing the evolution from judge-made to statutorily codified laws). 
 
176
 See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION chs. 1, 2 
(2010) (discussing judicial interpretive discretion when a law is unclear); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 
245 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical 
skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and 
equivocal, until their meaning be . . . ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”). 
 
177
 As Anthony Amsterdam long ago observed, use of a standard for enforcement can be “splendid in its 
flexibility, awful in its unintelligibility, unadministrability, unenforcibility and general ooziness.” Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 415 (1974). 
 
178
 See John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1044 (1974). 
 
179
 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456–61 
(2010) (discussing the “disposing power” of a government’s legislative branch—its authority to identify and 
codify criminal law norms); Robinson, supra note 175, at 340–41 (discussing structural and political reasons 
supporting legislative exclusivity in criminal law making). 
 
180
 Jeffries, supra note 19, at 223. 
 
181
 United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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The allowance, however, does more than augment executive power and 
undercut legislative primacy; it functions as an abdication of judicial authority. 
Courts find it “unnecessary” to interpret statutory language182 or content 
themselves with generalized assessments of whether an officer’s interpretation 
was reasonable.183 When this occurs, the law is left unelucidated and police are 
left without enforcement direction,184 aggravating deficits resulting from 
judicial failures to clarify Fourth Amendment norms more generally.185 
This failure assumes added significance when one considers the absence of 
other potentially operative, substantive-law-related limits. Vagueness doctrine 
could play a role, but it only rarely applies, creating what Debra Livingston has 
fairly termed an “illusory sense of formal accountability.”186 At the same time, 
the rule of lenity, invoked when laws are ambiguous, is of no help. Not only is 
the rule sparingly applied,187 but it also can have no effect here because a 
prosecution is not actually brought under the law about which an officer is 
mistaken. 
One reaction to the preceding admittedly formalistic view might lie in use 
of ex ante legal clarifications of uncertain laws. In this vein, Dan Kahan has 




 See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t [is] unnecessary to parse 
the words of the South Dakota statute [serving as a basis for the challenged stop].”). 
 
183
 See, e.g., United States v. Robledo, 185 F. App’x 556, 557 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“It is 
unnecessary for this court to decide whether Nebraska law [was violated by the conduct in question] . . . . The 
question before us is merely whether [the officer] had an objectively reasonable basis for believing Robledo 
breached a traffic law.”); United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 444 F.3d 1020, 1022–23 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(“Fortunately, we need not decide [the statutory interpretation] issue because the resolution of the case turns 
upon whether [the officer’s] belief that the statute was violated was objectively reasonable . . . .”). 
 
184
 See ENDICOTT, supra note 120, at 198 (“[Judges] resolv[e] unresolved disputes about the requirements 
of the law. . . . [They] have a duty to give (in fact, to impose) resolution. Resolution is a basic requirement of 
the rule of law.”). 
 
185
 See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the Law Is: How Certain Legal Doctrines Impede the 
Development of Constitutional Law and What Courts Can Do About It, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 87, 88–90 (2007) 
(noting how the good-faith exception has impeded development of Fourth Amendment doctrine); Zack Bray, 
Comment, Appellate Review and the Exclusionary Rule, 113 YALE L.J. 1143, 1144 (2004) (noting that 
appellate courts “duck” the underlying issue of whether probable cause was present by invoking the Leon 
standard). The constitutional deficit will likely increase with the Court’s recent decision in Pearson v. 
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 823 (2009), allowing courts faced with qualified immunity claims to avoid deciding 
whether police violated a constitutional norm and instead resolve cases based on whether the norm was 
“clearly established.” For more on the likely effect of Pearson, see Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity 
and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 139. 
 
186
 Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. 
REV. 141, 193. 
 
187
 See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 901–06 (2004) 
(noting that a majority of U.S. jurisdictions have either abolished the rule or narrowed its application). 
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deference to reasonable agency interpretations of indeterminate laws,188 should 
extend to the substantive law interpretations of the Justice Department in 
Washington, D.C. (Main Justice).189 Main Justice, Professor Kahan asserts, 
should be “treated as an authoritative law-expositor, and not merely an 
authoritative law-enforcer.”190 To Kahan, judicial deference to reasoned, 
prelitigation statutory interpretative judgments of Main Justice would hold 
promise of Chevron-like benefits, including enhanced criminal law expertise 
(relative to courts), uniformity (inasmuch as interpretation would emanate 
from a single agency), and parsimony (compared to individual U.S. Attorney 
offices, which can be vulnerable to pro-enforcement political interests).191 
Whatever the merits of Professor Kahan’s proposal in the context of federal 
prosecutors, the Chevronization of policing is problematic. To understand why 
this is so one need only consider how the rationales of Chevron fail to align 
with deference to police departmental legal interpretations. 
Delegation, while perhaps the leading rationale for agency deference in the 
federal regulatory realm,192 has considerably less appeal here. Whereas 
regulatory laws are thought to often contain purposeful uncertainty as a result 
of political compromise or complexity, justifying a finding of implied 
delegation,193 uncertain aspects of the low-level offenses mainly at issue here 
typically derive from the imprecision common to legislative creation of 
criminal laws.194 
The second Chevron rationale—agency expertise—affords a somewhat 




 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 
189
 Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996). 
 
190
 Id. at 469. 
 
191
 Id. at 489. 
 
192
 See Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1284 (2008) (“Arguably the leading 
rationale for Chevron deference is the presumption that Congress delegates interpretive authority to 
administrative agencies when it commits regulatory statutes to agency administration.”). 
 
193
 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 553 (2009) (discussing how under 
such circumstances “Congress does not always delegate expressly but often leaves interpretive questions for 
agencies to resolve”).  
 
194
 See, e.g., Frank J. Remington & Victor G. Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 
1960 U. ILL. L.F. 481, 488 (“Even the most careful of legislative draftsmanship is not likely to achieve a 
completely unambiguous definition of criminal conduct.”). 
 
195
 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (explaining that 
agencies have expertise in accommodating “manifestly competing interests,” especially when “the regulatory 
scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the 
decision involves reconciling conflicting policies” (footnotes omitted)). 
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officers possess unequaled experience with the range of behaviors that the laws 
implicate, and the Supreme Court has regularly deferred to police judgment 
and expertise.196 This background, however, does not necessarily translate into 
the legal and policy wherewithal often thought to justify deference to agency 
staff decisions.197 The interpretive issues that such laws raise are not, as 
Chevron expects, especially “technical and complex.”198 Rather, uncertainties 
are usually resolved by application of statutory construction tools, a mainstay 
of the judicial enterprise.199 Nor is it commonplace for officers or their 
superiors to “have had a hand in drafting” the laws in question or be in close 
contact with legislators or their staffs, which in the federal context is thought to 
enhance executive branch legal understanding.200 
Even more important, police interpretations unavoidably risk being colored 
by the reality that police departments are not neutral and detached arbiters.201 
For police, crime control is a highly salient and ever-present goal. They need 
never fear too much success; what they need fear is appearing soft on the 
criminal element—a threat embodied in narrow interpretation of a statute.202 
Deployed on the streets, broadened interpretive authority raises particular 




 See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 & n.6 (1989) (deferring to use of “drug courier” 
profile, consisting of officers’ posited accumulated knowledge of drug traffickers’ behaviors); Brown v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979) (noting deference to “the observations of a trained, experienced police officer who 




 See Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1574–78 (2007) (surveying frequent 
deference by federal appellate courts to agency expertise). 
 
198
 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 
199
 See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text (discussing the common-law-making power of courts 
vis-à-vis criminal laws). 
 
200
 See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368 
(1986) (discussing why agencies may have insight into the intent of Congress and therefore may be more adept 
than courts at interpreting laws). 
 
201
 See, e.g., Al Baker & Ray Rivera, 5 Officers Face Charges in Fudging of Statistics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
16, 2010, at A13 (discussing reports of quotas being used to encourage police seizures). 
 
202
 In this respect, the job of police administrators can be distinguished from that of regulators in areas 
such as environmental policy, where the metric of job performance is perhaps less clear-cut. Even more reason 
thus exists to be concerned that police administrators might advance views that are at variance with their own 
better judgment and experience, as evidenced in the regulatory agency realm. See Sanford N. Caust-
Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 
814 (1991) (“The very idea that an administrative agency reflects majoritarian values is at odds with prevalent 
conceptions of agency action.”). 
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discretionary behavior203 and the relative lack of resource constraints on 
officers’ power to stop and arrest.204 
Finally, it is hard to imagine what might be entailed in the administrative 
process rendering such interpretations. Decentralization is one of the hallmarks 
of American policing, with the vast majority of law enforcement being 
undertaken by state and local officers enforcing state and local laws.205 
Moreover, officers are usually employed by county, local, or municipal 
governments, not states,206 which often lack direct oversight power and 
responsibility as to them.207 
Allowing legal interpretations to emanate from multiple police departments 
would obviously create a host of problems. While the pluralization of policing 
surely has its virtues, including its potential legitimizing effect among local 
populations most directly affected,208 the sheer volume of police agencies 
(including 771 nationwide with only one officer209) makes high-quality 
deliberations and outcomes unlikely. In addition, pluralization would pose 
difficulties of Babel-like proportion for reviewing courts, requiring them to 




 See SKOLNICK, supra note 147, at 13 (“Police work constitutes the most secluded part of an already 
secluded system [of criminal justice] and therefore offers the greatest opportunity for arbitrary behavior.”); 
Foote, supra note 4, at 20–21 (discussing the absence of meaningful factual information regarding police 




 Prosecutors, for instance, especially in high-volume jurisdictions, have neither the time nor resources 
to charge and fully prosecute every minor offense brought to their attention. See generally Josh Bowers, Legal 
Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010). 
By contrast, police stops and arrests for minor offenses are low-resource undertakings, with major potential 




 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 786–87 
(2006) (noting the severalfold greater number of state and local law enforcement officers than federal agents). 
 
206
 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 2003, at 42 tbl.1.27 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2004) (noting that nationwide there 




 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 14–16, 223 (2001) 
(discussing institutional checks designed to fragment and limit power); Ian Loader, Plural Policing and 




 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 51 




 Id. at 49. 
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Conceivably, a state’s chief law enforcement entity could do the job, 
deploying the state’s equivalent of the Administrative Procedure Act.210 The 
prospect, however, becomes less tenable in light of the recognized 
disinclination of states themselves to adopt Chevron deference, in significant 
part due to the perceived lack of institutional experience and wherewithal of 
state agencies.211 A centralized interpretive outcome could come from the state 
attorney general’s office, the most direct parallel to Main Justice. Opinions of 
state attorneys general, however, tracking separation- and delegation-of-
powers concerns noted earlier,212 are usually deemed advisory and nonlegally 
binding by state courts.213 Moreover, as a practical matter, experience with 
other executive-generated, statewide criminal justice policies gives little reason 
to expect that any interpretive regime will be followed by state and local 
actors.214 
Chevron’s third chief rationale, the posited superior political accountability 
of agencies relative to courts, is equally unpersuasive here. State judges, unlike 
their life-tenured federal counterparts, often face election.215 Moreover, even if 
a state administrative entity were to issue an authoritative construction, the 
divided executive structure of many state governments could well undercut the 
promise of political accountability, with voters possibly experiencing 
confusion over which executive entity is responsible for a decision.216 
Ultimately, Chevron deference is ill-advised for the basic separation-of-




 On state analogs of the Act generally, see Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative 
Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551 (2001). 
 
211
 See D. Zachary Hudson, Comment, A Case for Varying Interpretive Deference at the State Level, 119 
YALE L.J. 373, 378–80 (2009) (arguing that the differences between federal and state agencies oblige that 
Chevron deference is unwarranted at the state level). 
 
212
 See supra notes 175–81 and accompanying text. 
 
213
 See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
61, 73–74 (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) (discussing the limited weight accorded attorney general opinions). 
 
214
 See, e.g., Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, The Reconstitution of Law in Local Settings: Agency 
Discretion, Ambiguity, and a Surplus of Law in the Policing of Hate Crime, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 893 (2005) 
(discussing varied implementation of statewide policy on hate-crime laws). 
 
215
 See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077 app. 2 (2007) 
(noting that 89% of all state court judges (trial and appellate) are subject to election). 
 
216
 In Florida, for instance, the Department of Law Enforcement is an executive agency under the 
authority of the governor, yet the Office of the Attorney General is an independent executive office whose 
head stands for independent election. On the institutional-clarity challenges presented in this regard more 
generally, see Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385 
(2008); and William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons 
from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446 (2006). 
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or agency-level legal interpretations would merely replace one executive 
actor’s interpretive handiwork with that of another. Fourth Amendment 
suppression hearings would not turn so much on whether an individual 
officer’s interpretation of a given law was mistaken but rather on whether the 
facts, as observed by the officer, come within the department or agency’s 
interpretation of codified law. If vague laws are thought to impermissibly 
relegate policy matters to police officers in their enforcement decisions, as the 
Supreme Court has held,217 use of executive-entity-generated interpretive rules 
are even more problematic. 
C. Legislative Accountability 
A final, yet closely related, reason to resist a reasonable-mistake exception 
lies in the democracy-forcing potential of the exclusionary rule itself. As Bill 
Stuntz has observed, the political economy of crime-control policy is such that 
legislators and executive branch actors (police and prosecutors) enjoy a natural 
alliance, ensuring enactment of more laws and thus more opportunities to 
exercise executive discretion to seize and prosecute,218 a power upon which the 
Supreme Court has refused to impose substantive limits.219 
In this environment, judicial condemnation of lawless seizures and 
application of the exclusionary rule can play a critical role. When courts 
indulge police legal misunderstandings, especially relative to textually 
uncertain laws, and withhold application of the exclusionary rule, legislators, 
likely politically sensitized to the “loss” of the more serious cases from which 




 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (condemning a vagrancy ordinance 




 See Stuntz, supra note 153, at 579 (noting a “tacit partnership” along these lines). As Professor Stuntz 
observes, the partnership is especially evident with low-level offenses, such as those mainly at issue here, the 
enforcement of which “make[s] policing cheaper[] because [such offences] permit searches and arrests with 
less investigative work,” constituting a “boon to police and legislators alike.” Id. at 539; cf. Illinois v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340, 365–66 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing institutional and political forces favoring 
legislators’ desire to “facilitate law enforcement,” possibly at the expense of Fourth Amendment values). 
 
219
 See supra note 13. On the Court’s reluctance to impose limits on the substantive criminal law more 
generally, see Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
1269 (1998); and Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All Other 
Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 783 (1994). 
 
220
 See, e.g., Krull, 480 U.S. at 365–66 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the “political role” of 
legislators vis-à-vis law enforcement). 
 
221
 Cf. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (condemning “[f]uzzy, 
leave-the-details-to-be-sorted-out-by-the-courts legislation” and noting that the Court’s “indulgence of 
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a result, police, the chief audience of legislators’ handiwork,222 have even less 
clarity in the substantive laws that delimit their otherwise virtually unfettered 
discretionary authority to stop and arrest.223 
The structural importance of the foregoing assumes added significance 
when one considers the absence of broader political pressures that might 
otherwise be brought to bear. Low-level offenses, especially those involving 
motor vehicles, potentially affect significant numbers of individuals, including 
those enjoying political influence who might be expected to provide effective 
political pushback.224 However, police pretextual resort to low-level offenses 
to stop and arrest is known to not fall uniformly on the polity.225 And even if 
politically empowered individuals feel aggrieved, they will lack significant 
political (and litigation) motivation because they will not face actual 
conviction (presuming no evidence is found justifying an unrelated 
prosecution).226 Meanwhile, those with the greatest personal stake, criminal 
defendants facing serious prison time based on evidence seized, will have the 
least influence over the political process.227 
 
imprecisions that violate the Constitution encourages imprecisions that violate the Constitution”); Dunn v. 
United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112–13 (1979) (“[T]o ensure that a legislature speaks with special clarity when 
marking the boundaries of criminal conduct, courts must decline to impose punishment for actions that are not 
‘plainly and unmistakably’ proscribed.” (quoting United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917))); Cass 
R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 
(1996) (noting that judicial enforcement of the vagueness doctrine can be “democracy-forcing” insofar as it 
“requires legislatures to speak with clarity”). 
 
222
 See William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1871 (2000) (“Notice who 
criminal law’s audience is: law enforcers, not ordinary citizens. Ordinary people do not have the time or 
training to learn the contents of criminal codes . . . . Criminal codes therefore do not and cannot speak to 
ordinary citizens directly. . . . For the most part, criminal law regulates actors in the legal system, while 
popular norms—morals—regulate the conduct of the citizenry.”); see also Drury Stevenson, To Whom Is the 
Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 105 (2003) (discussing ways in which legal texts have state actors, 
not the lay public, as their chief audience). 
 
223
 See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text. 
 
224
 See Stuntz, supra note 205, at 795 (noting common police resort to motor vehicle stops and consequent 
potential “latent popular demand for regulating policing”). 
 
225
 See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text; see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 
372 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[A]s the recent debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too 




 See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1482 (1996) (“The criminal defendant . . . functions as a private attorney general, ever-
vigilant in preventing government misconduct that would otherwise . . . harm those the Fourth Amendment 
was intended to protect.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
227
 See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent 
Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2046–49 (2006) (discussing the relative lack of political 
influence of criminal defendants). 
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The upshot of this failure in accountability ultimately will be felt on the 
streets. With police left free to reasonably err, there will be increases in the 
already alarmingly high number of legally baseless seizures,228 invisible to the 
public at large,229 with all the negative social consequences they carry.230 
IV.  RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 
As the preceding discussion makes clear, it is essential that courts condemn 
police mistakes of law as constitutionally unreasonable and back the 
conclusion with the exclusionary rule. Doing so, however, offers only a partial 
solution. Police, expected to enforce legal codes of ever-growing volume and 
complexity, must be given tools more commensurate to the task. As this Part 
develops, the most promising solution lies in improving both the amount and 
quality of substantive law police training, both pre- and in-service, to promote 
police legal knowledge and help ensure that mistakes are, if not eradicated, at 
least minimized in number. 
Training of American law enforcement personnel has been regrettably slow 
in coming. While training efforts date back to at least the early 1900s,231 for 




 See Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1461, 1490 n.161 (noting that only 4% of more than a half million individuals stopped, questioned, and 
frisked in 2006 were actually arrested (citing N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP’T, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT 
(NYPD) STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK DATABASE, 2006, http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR21660)). On the 
historic occurrence of the phenomenon more generally, see FLOYD FEENEY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ARRESTS WITHOUT CONVICTION: HOW OFTEN THEY OCCUR AND WHY (1983); and Surell Brady, Arrests 
Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 
229
 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[I]nvasion of the 
personal liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical redress. There may be, and I am convinced that 
there are, many unlawful searches . . . of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating . . . .”); see also 
Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the U.S. 
Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 332 (2004) (providing results of a field study indicating that 
only 3% of unconstitutional searches revealed evidence, obviating the likelihood of a motion to suppress in the 
balance (97%) of cases). 
 
230
 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 133 n.8 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (asserting that high rates of stops not resulting in arrest “indicate that society as a whole is paying a 
significant cost in infringement on liberty”). For a discussion of the negative effects such stops have on race 
relations in particular, see supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
 
231
 See George H. Brereton, The Importance of Training and Education in the Professionalization of Law 
Enforcement, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 111, 112 (1961) (noting training school efforts in 
1906 Pennsylvania, 1911 Detroit, and 1917 New York). 
 
232
 See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON POLICE 4 (1931) (“No pains 
are taken . . . to educate, train, and discipline for a year or two the prospective patrolmen and to eliminate from 
their number such as are shown to be incompetent for their prospective duties.”); Brereton, supra note 231, at 
113–17 (noting that effective training was lacking as of 1961); Donald C. Stone, Police Recruiting and 
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come until 1961, when Mapp v. Ohio imposed the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule on states and governments significantly ramped up efforts. In 
1967, the federal government recommended that states establish commissions 
empowered to set mandatory minimum training requirements and provided 
funding to realize training goals.233 By 1968, thirty-one states had training 
entities.234 Five years later, however, morticians and cosmeticians still received 
far more training than police officers,235 supporting the longstanding view that 
“[i]gnorance of police duties is no handicap to a successful career as a 
policeman.”236 
Today, training is an accepted rite of passage for police cadets, and the 
Supreme Court has posited that training has evolved to the extent that the 
exclusionary rule is now less necessary.237 Data on training actually afforded 
state and local police, however, belies this faith—especially relative to 
substantive law. The deficit was first evidenced in the influential 1973 report 
of the National Advisory Commission on Standards and Goals,238 carried out 
under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which 
promulgated standards for police. Standard 16.3 recommended that a mere 




Training, 24 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 996, 1001 (1934) (“Why should a man learn the criminal 
law of the State of Illinois through trial and error, if he can learn it through instruction?”). 
 
233
 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 
IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) (recommending that each state create a Peace Officers Standards and Training 
(POST) Commission); see also Dennis Catlin & Larry T. Hoover, Role of Law Enforcement Training 




 George A. Lankes, How Should We Educate the Police?, 61 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 
587, 587 (1970). 
 
235




 CHARLES REITH, THE BLIND EYE OF HISTORY: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT POLICE ERA 
106 (Patterson Smith Publ’g Co. 1975) (1952). For a concise overview of the historic evolution toward more 
and better police training, see M. R. HABERFELD, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICE TRAINING 58–61 (2002). 
 
237
 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 
238
 POLICE, supra note 235. 
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Topic Number of Hours % Total Course 
Introduction to the Criminal Justice System 32 8 
Law 40 10 
Human Values and Problems 88 22 
Patrol and Investigation Procedures 132 33 
Police Proficiency 72 18 
Administration 36 9 
Total 400 100239 
The forty-hour exposure to “Law,” moreover, extended well beyond 
substantive law. Specific subjects included: “[a]n introduction to the 
development, philosophy, and types of law; criminal law; criminal procedure 
and rules of evidence; discretionary justice; application of the U.S. 
Constitution; court systems and procedures; and related civil law.”240 
Unfortunately, subsequent years have not witnessed much improvement. 
For instance, a 1993 survey of state agencies reported that while all exceeded 
the minimum overall hour requirement, with a mean of almost 805 hours, they 
on average dedicated only 13.5% of instructional time to “Law.”241 
Meanwhile, a 2006 survey reported that a median of 36 hours (8%) of 
instructional time was dedicated to criminal law, with categories denominated 
“Operations” (e.g., report writing, investigations) garnering 172 hours; 
“Weapons/self-defense” 123 hours; and “Self-improvement” (e.g., ethics and 
integrity, health and fitness, stress prevention/management, and basic foreign 
language) 75 hours.242 In addition, “Community policing” (e.g., cultural 
diversity/human relations, mediation skills/conflict management) consumed 27 
hours, and “Special topics” (e.g., domestic violence, juveniles, domestic 
preparedness, and hate/bias crimes) received 34 hours of classroom 
instruction.243 
The content of police training curricula has long been debated, with no 




 Id. standard 16.3, cmt. at 394. 
 
240
 Id. The category “Police Proficiency” entailed instruction on such matters as permissible use of force, 
crowd control, physical conditioning, emergency medical services, and driver training. Id. 
 
241
 Terry D. Edwards, State Police Basic Training Programs: An Assessment of Course Content and 
Instructional Methodology, AM. J. POLICE, 1993, at 23, 30, 32 tbl.3. 
 
242
 BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING 
ACADEMIES, 2006, at 6 & tbl.11 (2009). 
 
243
 Id. at 6 tbl.11. 
 
244
 See, e.g., Nancy Marion, Police Academy Training: Are We Teaching Recruits What They Need to 
Know?, 21 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 54, 54 (1998) (“[T]here is disagreement over the 
appropriate curriculum, format and instructors that comprise effective police training.”). 
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Policing inevitably entails a multifaceted menu of tasks, with significant time 
and effort dedicated to social welfare, not law enforcement per se,245 and 
curricula reflect this reality. Modern training also reflects the need for 
administrative competencies (e.g., report writing), as well as a variety of other 
skills thought necessary for effective policing, including human relations and 
use of force. As a result, substantive law training has received increasingly less 
attention.246 
While empirical estimates of the exclusionary rule’s impact have varied 
over the years,247 there has been no mistaking that the specter of its application 
has prompted police departments to significantly fortify and improve their 
training efforts relative to Fourth Amendment expectations.248 The same can be 
hoped for today with respect to the substantive law that now serves as the chief 
restraint on the otherwise-unfettered discretionary seizure authority of police. 
Rather than excusing bad substantive law training and creating conditions 
conducive to a race to the bottom,249 courts—consistent with Leon’s premise of 
a “reasonably well trained officer”250—should incentivize departments 
(complicit in what Herring would term culpable “systemic” error251) to expand 




 See DAVID E. BARLOW & MELISSA HICKMAN BARLOW, POLICE IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 14 
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 For instance, in 1969, one unspecified county police academy dedicated 119 of its 339.5 recruit-
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Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1372–74 (2008) (same). 
 
248
 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 n.20 (1984) (lauding “the impetus [the rule] has provided 
to police training programs that make officers aware of the limits imposed by the fourth amendment and 
emphasize the need to operate within those limits” (quoting Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger 
Court, and the Legend of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1412 (1977))). An even more striking 
educational success story is found in training designed to reduce unwarranted police resort to deadly force. See 
Note, Retreat: The Supreme Court and the New Police, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1711–12 (2009). 
 
249
 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Circuit caselaw lending weight in the 
reasonableness assessment to the existence of erroneous academy training). 
 
250
 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. 
 
251
 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009). 
 
252
 An additional incentive might lie in law enforcement license certification authorities recognizing 
departments for their exemplary substantive law training efforts. On the salutary effects of proactive 
institutional reform measures by police departments more generally, see Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil 
Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
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able to lend weight to the substantive law knowledge base of police, the 
consistency of which has been a source of judicial concern.253 
The difficulty of the task at hand should not be underestimated. Police 
officers, typically lacking in formal legal education, cannot (as the Eighth 
Circuit and other courts have concluded) realistically be expected to interpret 
laws with the same competence and sophistication as trained lawyers and 
judges. However, this deficit should not be used as a basis to excuse their 
mistakes of law. While police perhaps cannot be expected to “know” all 
positive law,254 they fairly can be expected to know the laws that they elect to 
invoke on street patrol and, in instances of substantive uncertainty, as 
discussed, should be deterred from expansive interpretations.255 
Ironically, the very success of the educational mission advocated here 
could eventually call into question the deterrent utility of the exclusionary rule. 
There could come a time, as advocates of the Eighth Circuit position would 
likely assert, when departments are doing all they possibly can to ensure that 
their officers are “reasonably well trained” per Leon. Even assuming that a 
level of training optimality could be achieved and certified by a reviewing 
court, however, such an argument should be rejected. This is because only 
when officers and departments know that mistakes, even reasonable ones, will 
result in loss of evidence will they do their utmost to ensure that quality 




 See, e.g., Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004) (expressing concern that a varied substantive 
law knowledge base among police would result in the permissibility of an arrest “vary[ing] from place to place 
and from time to time” (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). By the same token, the Court’s frequent ascription of weight to effective police training in 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations, see, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) 
(per curiam), will warrant greater justification as such assessments themselves are inextricably tied to the 
substantive law. For more on the role of police training and experience as a key “circumstance” in the review 
of probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations, see Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and 
Three-Dollar Steaks: The Subjective/Objective Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, 12 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 751 (2010). 
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 See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 159 (1935) (“No policeman can learn all 
[laws] and therefore he cannot know what to ‘enforce’ . . . .”). 
 
255
 See supra Part II.B. 
 
256
 Training efforts logically would thus tend toward mastery of substantive law, rather than chicanery and 
avoidance, as too often has been the case with training relative to constitutional procedural expectations. See 
Donald Dripps, The Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, and the Roberts Court: Normative and 
Empirical Dimensions of the Over-Deterrence Hypothesis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 238 (2010) (noting that 
such training is often “more concerned with admissibility than with legality”). 
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Police agencies, however, need not—indeed, should not—go it alone. 
Prosecutors, their fellow executive branch actors, can play a critical 
cooperative role in training, a position urged by the ABA Standards.257 Equally 
important, consistent with the screening practices of many large-volume 
offices,258 prosecutors should refuse to proceed with cases that are based on 
stops or arrests of questionable substantive legal justification.259 Keeping such 
cases out of the system would, of course, come at the cost of the democracy-
enforcing function of the exclusionary rule, discussed above.260 However, it 
can safely be presumed that no prosecutor’s office would relish seeing 
dismissal of the more serious cases arising out of such mistakes, heightening 
the likelihood that prosecutors will lobby for refinement of a particular law or, 
if this is not possible, abandonment of its codification altogether. 
Ultimately, it is hoped, the reform advocated here will do more than merely 
help ensure police knowledge of substantive law. In the long term, it will help 
transform police organizational culture itself, which is known to exercise a 
potent influence on police behavior.261 Consistent with exclusionary rule 
rationale and doctrine,262 departments and rank-and-file officers alike will 
come to have a heightened appreciation of the need to know and follow the 
laws that they are charged with enforcing. No longer will “rules-of-thumb,” 
rather than legal specifics, be conceived as permissible bases to drive 
discretionary decisions to seize individuals.263 As a consequence, the many 
illegal seizures ostensibly justified by substantive law of which we are aware—




 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-
2.7(b) (3d ed. 1993) (recommending that prosecutor offices “cooperate with police in providing the services of 
the prosecutor’s staff to aid in training police in the performance of their function in accordance with law”). 
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 See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 58–84 
(2002) (discussing how rigorous screening policies in New Orleans lessened the resort to pleas). 
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260
 See supra Part III.C. 
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Discretionary Decision Making, 11 POLICE Q. 315, 320–35 (2008). 
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challenge264—will be reduced, along with the unjustified privacy invasions that 
typically attend. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined a phenomenon that most Americans would 
consider a constitutional impossibility: police officers, with the backing of 
courts, using their mistaken understandings of laws as bases to seize 
individuals. In 1965, the landscape was such that Wayne LaFave could 
confidently write that “[n]o one would assert that law enforcement agencies 
have a right to exercise discretion beyond the outer boundaries of the law 
defining criminal conduct, such as by arresting for conduct which the 
legislature has not declared to be a crime.”265 As the Article establishes, such 
confidence, if warranted then, is no longer warranted today. Police in several 
jurisdictions can now seize individuals based on their mistaken legal 
understandings and use such seizures to secure evidence or information to 
justify independent, typically much more serious criminal prosecutions. 
The willingness of courts to declare illegal seizures constitutionally 
reasonable, while surely troubling as a normative Fourth Amendment matter, is 
occurring at a critically important time. Today, police can invoke any and all 
laws to stop and arrest individuals, even if they do so as a pretext to investigate 
other wrongdoing266 and in violation of attendant procedural limits.267 
Moreover, when they seize individuals, their assessments of wrongdoing are 
generously evaluated in terms of reasonable suspicion268 and probable cause,269 
and their reasonable mistakes of fact in support thereof are forgiven.270 Police 
also enjoy expansive substantive law authority to seize individuals based on 




 See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text. 
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7–22 (1994) (discussing Terry and its progeny). 
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standard-like legal rules.272 They cannot now also be permitted to stop and 
arrest based on their mistaken understandings of the meaning and scope of 
laws regulating more particularized behavior. 
In the final analysis, the threat posed by police mistakes of law goes to the 
very essence of what the governed can rightfully expect of their government’s 
law enforcement agents. This expectation, as the Article shows, unavoidably 
entails an epistemic and interpretive component too long ignored. It is hoped 
that the discussion here will inspire greater recognition of the importance of 
this deficit and the peril associated with forgiving mistakes of law, leading to 
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